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Today, on 23 January 2019 the Commission released its ‘Report on Investor
Citizenship and Residence Schemes in the European Union.’ Given the negative
attention the whole issue of selling EU citizenship and residence has been receiving
from the powers that be in the European Union, be it the European Parliament or
the individual Commissioners from Reading’s ‘EU citizenship should not be for
sale’ from several years ago to Jourová’s more recent proclamations, lawyers and
policy-makers could expect much more from the Commission’s treatment of this
much inflated, but hugely important topic. Only way under 1% of EU citizenships
and residences are investment-based, which the Commission never mentions. The
Report, which is clearly a result of a huge log-rolling exercise, will definitely not be
entered on the roll-call of the documents the Commission could even vaguely be
proud of. Rather than provide a clear rule-based analysis of the forces underlying
the moral panic behind the sacredness of belonging offered for sale of which I am
a long-standing bemused observer, the Report, regrettably, turns against the key
achievements of the Union to misrepresent EU citizenship law in the guise of a 19th-
century Blut und Boden mysterium, as opposed to a modern, globalized forward-
looking status. The Union emerging from the pages of the Report is nothing short of
Hamsunian, full of ‘nature’, ‘genuine links’ and ‘real’ citizenships, based on long-dead
ideals and thus impossibly dull. Given that there is no legal basis in TEU or TFEU for
the pursuit of a ‘natural’ citizenship as it once was – as discussed by Spiro – it does
not come as a surprise that the Commission resorts to obsolete legal authority and
abundant flawed legal reasoning to sell the untenable position it has no legal basis
to properly defend. One wonders why the legal service did not get a chance to see
the document (presumably). Given that the law is straightforward, this could alleviate
a lot of embarrassment for outgoing Commissioner Jourová and the Institution as a
whole.  
The Report is correct on many facts it communicates: indeed, Bulgaria, Cyprus,
Malta and, less systematically Austria and potentially other Member States offer EU
citizenship for investment. Moreover, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Malta,
the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia and the UK offer (permanent)
residence statuses for investment, which are often convertible into citizenship
of those Member States. To summarize: 20 or more (i.e. more than 70% of the)
Member States opted for a policy, which the Commission has no direct competence
to regulate, but tackles in the Report. This alone makes the Commission’s take on
investment migration worth looking at in some detail: what is on the Commission’s
mind?
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Framing investment migration uniquely as a risk,
rather than an opportunity
Undoubtedly, there is a fundamentally important issue at hand: investment migration
is capable of bringing huge gains, but also generate risks. The Commission is dead-
silent on the former, presumably deferring to the 70+% of the Member States on
this crucial issue, but is absolutely right about mentioning the latter. When ran in
non-transparent and corrupt ways investment migration – like any other enterprise
– will certainly generate problems. In fact, the Report is such that it presents the
whole issue of investment migration uniquely as a risk, rather than an opportunity.
In particular, the Commission speaks of the risks regarding ‘security, money-
laundering, tax evasion and corruption’.
The fact that 20 Member States market residence, residence leading to citizenship,
or citizenship directly, as the Commission correctly reports, makes clear that cost
and benefit analysis has been conducted by at least 20 governments, opting
to introduce the schemes with the benefits to be reaped in mind. This makes
Commission’s view that ‘it difficult to assert that any direct inflows would not
have happened without such schemes’ – the only reference to the benefits 20
governments try to harness on more than 20 pages of dull but cunning text –
somewhat problematic. This could be right for some countries. Sumption and
Hooper have shown, for instance, that UK Tire 1 visas, like the one revoked from
Abramovich leading to a loss in a billion investment into a new stadium, a visa
type that formally requires buying bonds, do not affect the country’s economic
performance. This statement cannot be true for all the 20 jurisdictions, however.
Consider applying it to countries requiring a donation, like Malta, rather than an
investment with its expected return. While with Cyprus, for instance, this could
indeed be the case – however doubtful the hypothesis – that, for some reason, even
more Russian money would be passing the island without citizenships on offer, in the
case of Malta it is absolutely clear that the contributions, which are paid in exchange
for citizenship would not, under any circumstances whatsoever, be made without the
Malta’s Individual Investment Programme offering the goods, for which the money is
paid.
To put it differently, what is ‘difficult to assert’ for the Commission is in fact several
per cent of Malta’s GDP and the result of an analysis by 20 Member States of the
EU to introduce investment migration programmes in national law. In other words,
silence on the benefits the overwhelming majority of the Member States either
receives or believes to be receiving unquestionably sheds the Commission’s work in
a deeply biased light: the suggestion is that 20 Member States are behaving deeply
irrationally, which is implausible and deeply political. Without denying the potential
risks, which are rightly pointed out by the Commission, it is nevertheless possible to
assert that the aim of the Report is the misrepresentation of investment migration,
given that, notwithstanding the fact that the title of the report mentions citizenship
and investor residence schemes, it is entirely silent on the raison d’être of both,
something that should have been, instead, the starting point of any serious analysis.
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An incompetent hymn to Blood and Soil
The Commission claims to have discovered what citizenship is about, writing that
citizenship ‘is traditionally based on … ius sanguinis and … ius soli’. This is all
correct, but the Devil, as only so frequently, is in the detail. In giving its ‘golden
standard’, the Commission does not make clear that a) it does not have the
power to regulate this area; b) that the reality is much more complex that what its
selective summary purports to demonstrate. The combination of the two is extremely
problematic, befogging the crucial issue of citizenship acquisition rules to a great
degree and enabling the Commission to squeeze in several bizarre claims into the
text. 
Referring to citizenship by investment the Commission writes that, in essence,
such ‘citizenship is granted under less stringent conditions than under ordinary
naturalization regimes’. What is crucial here is to mention the differences, marking
citizenship law of all the Member States to rationally accommodate the acquisition
of citizenship by different categories of applicants. Besides, of importance is also
the sovereignty aspect of this story. Starting with the latter, states are free to confer
citizenship on those whom they consider qualified under the Hague Convention of
Nationality (Art. 1) and, unquestionably, under EU law – as Shaw, myself, and, most
recently, Jessurun d’Oliveira and Sarmiento, have demonstrated. By extension this
applies to EU citizenship, which is derivative – ius tractum – citizenship. No sane
academic voice would be able to argue that the EU has competence to legislate
here, which is why the Report is not a legislative proposal and will never be one.
As will not be a surprise to the reader, France still decides on who is French and
has all the rights to do so, just as Malta on who is Maltese or Finland on who is
Finnish. The law is crystal-clear, just as is the fact that all the Member States find the
continuation of this approach vital to their interest – which makes the Commission’s
report look like a poorly-orchestrated attempted power-grab. In establishing any
mode of acquisition of citizenship, where the Commission has no say by law, it
is impossible to come up with a rigid framework, which the Report purports to
have found, but the aspiration is clear. To present Malta, Cyprus, or Bulgaria as
breaching the fundamental principles of EU law would be too much: they use
their legal competence to naturalize third country nationals in strict accordance
with the law. This is exactly why the Commission merely uses a negative tone,
instead of explaining what is wrong. The answer is: nothing is wrong and the tone
is unacceptable. Consequently, the reasons for mentioning that ‘these schemes are
explicitly advertised as a means of acquiring EU citizenship’ are unclear, since the
schemes are created to make new EU citizens. 
EU law is funny in a way – and this is its unquestionable, pluralist strength. A US kid
able to find a Greek great-great grand-father becomes an EU citizen automatically
without ever visiting Greece; a spouse of a Frenchman in Vietnam naturalizes
without ever living in France, an EU citizen does not need to give up original
nationality when naturalizing in Germany, unlike any non-EU nationality holder,
and a Catholic dignitary retiring from Vatican becomes an Italian automatically and
immediately not under ‘less stringent conditions’, but because these are the groups,
- 3 -
which are treated by immigration and citizenship law differently in the Member States
concerned. 
Perusal of any citizenship law book makes as much clear: when we speak about
the acquisition of citizenship, differentiated treatment of different cases is key.
Member States establish what is desirable and while Italy has decided that asking
an ailing Japanese Cardinal, stateless upon retirement from Vatican service, to wait
10 years to become Italian is undesirable replacing it with zero years instead, just
as the Dutch government has decided that asking asylum seekers to wait as long
as others to naturalize, or the Maltese government, having a significant donation
in mind, to drive the economy of the island. In the light of the existing differences
supported by numbers, where hundreds of thousands became EU citizens through
extremely remote ancestry or other ways having nothing to do with the state or its
‘culture’ through Bulgaria, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Romania and other states, stating
that investment citizenship is ‘less stringent’ as the Commission does is an absurd
misrepresentation.
To push this line home, this is even more absurd at least for two reasons. Most
importantly, all other ways to acquire citizenship do not require a significant
investment. An American kid, like the son of a Venezuelan friend, searching through
archives for any Greek connections not to pay US-rate tuitions at Bologna Medical
School is not bringing several millions to Greece. To imply that undying Greekness
persists over six generations, however much ethno-nationalist and passé, is a
decision for the Greek government to take, which fits the general international
trends, as Joppke has shown. Even political commentators of the left would agree:
money seems to be important. So the Cypriot choice to make citizens is at least as
(ir)rational as the Greek, but not to a protestor in the ‘Macedonia is Greece’ crowds
of course, which our US kid, thankfully, will never join. The question of what is ‘legal’
does not arise, since it is not up to the Commission to ask or comment on and given
that international law, just as European, is clear: Member States will decide as they
see fit: so for Malta EUR 650.000 is more important than nationalism, while for
Greece the opposite is true. Some would applaud this choice. To suggest, however,
that some other choice is somehow ‘less legal’ would not be correct. And morality
has never played a role in citizenship law, especially in the EU with its colonial
past and essentially race-based exclusion from EU citizenship approved by the
ECJ in Kaur. Globally the picture is no different: citizenship is the main tool for the
preservation of global inequality at the moment, as Milanovic has explained. 
Secondly, and equally importantly, ‘ordinary conditions’ – as opposed to the frowned-
upon ‘less stringent’ ones – imply a level of due diligence, which is significantly
lower than what investment citizenship promises: the entirety of one’s finances and
business connections, as well as all the story of your past would not normally be dug
up by independent due diligence providers, unless you are an investor naturalizing
on that ground.
This is only right: different applicants require different standards. The absurdity of
implying, as the Commission does, that investing several millions and going through
deep scrutiny is less stringent than finding a Greek man in the ancestry (citizenship
las has traditionally been sexist, of course), whom you have never met, speaks for
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itself. This begs the conclusion that the ‘context’ of citizenship acquisition, to which
the Commission dedicated a whole section in its Report, is misleading: forgetting to
mention ‘difference’ amounts to failing to tell a true story.
Flawed reasoning rooted in obsolete authority
The second main flaw of the Report after misrepresenting investment migration
it purports to describe is its failure to come to terms with the basic meaning of
citizenship in law as an abstract legal status. Brubaker famously defines citizenship
as an ‘object and instrument of closure’, that is: selecting those who ‘belong’ from
the available number of bodies and guarding the selected entity from those who
do not ‘belong’. It means that not caring about the county and its purported values
will not make you less of a citizen in the eyes of the law, just as caring a lot about
some officially endorsed ‘culture’ or language will not make you a citizen, unless
you are named such by law. Pretending that this is not the case – and many
countries go to absurd length with this, like my own Kingdom – is deeply unhelpful.
  When the Commission informs us that ‘the study looked at other factors … which
might arguably create a link between the applicant for citizenship and the country
concerned’ a citizenship lawyer reading it is puzzled. It is fundamental to realize that
only citizenship can be such a link. To present citizenship – an abstract legal status
– as something that requires more than itself in order to be enjoyed is not faithful to
the letter and the spirit of global citizenship law as it stands today. Even more, the
Commission’s analysis smells of the totalitarianism of 19th century approaches to
allegiance.
It is impossible, with recourse to the law in force, to justify the Commission’s position,
since it would mean that all what the EU stands for: liberal values, non-discrimination
on the basis of nationality, human dignity and equality, is opposable on the basis
of clear-cut nationalist tropes of ‘links’ with states and cultures pre-approved by
the powers that be. The whole point of the text of the Report is the Commission’s
apparent desire to play such a totalitarian role: is this Maltese a ‘real’ Maltese? What
if he has never visited the European Union? What about this Irish-woman? This
is where the obsolete case-law of the International Court of Justice (!) expressly
overruled by the EU’s own Court of Justice comes into play: the Commission refers,
quite extensively, to Nottebohm’s theory of ‘genuine links’. 
It is of course the case that the Commission’s file handlers could be unaware of the
fact that the case was opposed to immediately after it was decided by Jones, Kunz,
Panhuys, Weis – the list of authorities could be continued ad infinitum – and later
dismissed by de Groot, Jessurun d’Olivera, Macklin, Sloane, Thwaites, Vermeer-
Kunzli and many others, as Spiro has splendidly summarized. What they could not
overlook, however, is that ‘genuine links’ are incompatible with a world which is not
composed of ‘genuine jails’, what the Court of Justice confirmed in Micheletti: as
per Advocate General Tesauro, the ‘romantic period of international law’ is over.
It is thus quite unacceptable, in the respectful opinion of this author, to provide a
reference to ‘genuine links’ and Nottebohm in an official Report of the European
Commission as a reference to ‘international arena’. The reference is flawed, since
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the Court of Justice of the European Union has expressly prohibited the Member
States from relying on Nottebohm in dealing with each other’s nationals. The Report
contradicts itself, since this fact is mentioned in footnote 26. You cannot have a
rule ‘in the international arena’, which is at the same time expressly prohibited by
the highest EU Court, with an immediate effect, of course, of blocking Nottebohm
in the territory of the EU. This point is absolutely crucial: the Commission’s Report
knowingly misrepresents EU law. 
References to the obsolete authority only start the Commission’s puzzling campaign
of putting legal reasoning to sleep. The Report essentially claims that since checking
genuine links is expressly prohibited by EU law in Micheletti (mentioned correctly
in a footnote), Member States have to ensure that such links exist. A prohibition
is tuned into an implied obligation, ladies and gentlemen. In outlawing any such
links in Micheletti the Court of Justice has apparently instructed someone – in the
mind of the Commission – to check whether the ‘genuine links’ are there. This
could not be further from the truth. Quite on the contrary, the Court has in fact
clarified that ‘genuine links’ do not apply in the context of the EU and that Nottebohm
is bad law: the case-handlers could check a textbook. It is settled case-law that
no residence in any of the Member States is required in order for an EU citizens
to use free movement rights protected by EU law. The Commission is trying, in
its Report, to use precisely the prohibition of the checking of the ‘genuine links’
unequivocally coming directly from the Court of Justice itself as a pretext to imply
that there is an obligation to check the existence of such links. Frankfurt’s ‘On
Bullshit’ is at least a philosophical joke, even if only mildly entertaining, while the
Commission’s text purports to be serious and drive policy decisions. Given that
Nottebohm unquestionably is bad law and the Commission was obliged to know it,
and taken into account the reasoning of the Commission, trying to undermine the
internal market, established case-law on free movement of persons and the rule
of EU law established in Micheletti amounts, in fact, to the Commission knowingly
misleading the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and
Social Committee and the Committee of Regions, to whom the Report is addressed.
This could be an example of the violation of the duty of loyalty, should the Report be
more convincing.
Curious assumptions about the connection between
residence, citizenship and security
It is when looking for the possible solutions for the risks in terms of security, tax
evasion and money laundering, however, that the Report reaches a truly esoteric
level: the Commission’s analysis seems to be based the assumption, which is
nowhere explained or defended properly, that presence in one of the Member States
for a period of time before naturalization is likely to alleviate some security risks. In
fact, numerous recent security threats in the EU were caused by first- or second-
generation EU citizens who never claimed to be jetsetters or millionaires. Even
moving beyond the fact that residence in an ethnic ghetto could also definitely be
residence in a Member State, it is impossible to make a convincing argument that
going through one particular naturalization procedure the Commission would have
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in mind makes one a less dangerous person. In fact, as long as Maltese billionaires
do not stab people at Christmas markets, or ram vans into crowds the assumption
entertained by the Commission rests unproven.
This also undermines the appeal of the Commission’s findings akin to ‘this means
that applicants can acquire citizenship of Bulgaria, Cyprus or Malta – and hence EU
citizenship – without ever having resided in practice in the Member State.’ The only
answer is ‘Of course!’, in a situation where hundreds of thousands of EU citizens
have never been to the EU in their lives and there is no legal requirement, either
in EU or in International law, to bother to visit one’s country of citizenship – not
everyone is fond of grandparents’ graves. Even moving beyond this obvious reality
well-known to the Commission: EU citizenship does not have independent grounds
of acquisition. This means that – just as with Greek, or Irish, or French citizenship it
would be derived from – it is entirely incorrect to imply that it requires any residence
anywhere in particular. What it requires in fact, is the observance of the law –
French, or Maltese – democratically passed by the relevant Parliament. Moreover,
the continued possession of citizenship is not dependent, unlike the global practice
until half a century ago, on residence in any particular territory. EU citizens born in
Chicago with this status will remain EU citizens even if they never visit the EU. If they
do, no due diligence or security checks will be conducted at all of course. This is the
most basic context of how all the citizenships in the world operate: citizenship does
not require residence and residence does not mean that someone is less of a threat.
Less important misrepresentation of EU law
Lastly – everywhere throughout the Report the Commission underlines the risks
related to the freedom of movement of the new citizens between the Member States
after naturalization. There is a problem here. Framing the use of the most important
right of citizenship under EU law uniquely as a risk is not entirely correct. What could
be mentioned – following Kälin – is that all the individuals naturalized via citizenship
by investment are in fact ideal EU citizens in the light of Directive 2004/38: they will
never be a burden on the social security systems of the host Member States and will
obviously have a comprehensive health insurance – the two core requirements to be
met in order to benefit from the free movement right under Article 21 TFEU. Also the
Report’s wording about ‘circumventing certain nationality requirements’ is unhelpful
and is no doubt a misunderstanding: naturalizing by investment makes one a citizen
of Malta, i.e. is a vehicle to meeting the requirement of nationality. Becoming a
citizen – either through marriage to a Dutch lady or serving in the French foreign
legion – cannot be equated with circumventing a requirement. Most worrisomely, the
Commission seems to hint at discrimination on the basis of the ground of citizenship
acquisition, which is prohibited in EU law since C-214/94 Boukhalfa case-law, which
it does not cite.
Leaving Boukhalfa, which is not in all the textbooks anymore aside, the Commission
has had problems brushing up on the knowledge of Directive 2003/103 too, it
appears, as several Member States are implicitly criticized for establishing an easier
way that the requirement of that Directive, to access their national Permanent
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Residence. This criticism is unacceptable, since Directive 2003/109 states
unequivocally in Article 13 that: 
“Member States may issue residence permits of permanent or unlimited
validity on terms that are more favourable than those laid down by this
Directive” (emphasis added). 
To be absolutely clear: to imply that the Directive establishes the minimal threshold
of defining permanent residence in the EU – as Carrera famously has done (p. 18)
– is quite incorrect, since the text of the provision above is quite clear. It is of course
true that national requirements, which are more lenient that those set out in Directive
2003/109 will not produce EU-level rights for the holders of the permits, the point
covered in the literature by van den Brink, but this is not the general point the Report
seems to be making. The Report is taking issue, erroneously, with the low physical
presence thresholds under the national legislation on investment residence in Malta,
Greece and Bulgaria. Once again: this criticism is moot, since the Directive expressly
allows the Member States to set the presence requirement at zero (“0”) days. This
is the law the Commission is there to respect and uphold. In fact, it is unclear why
it is criticizing the decisions legitimately taken by three Member State governments
clearly within their realm of competence and breaching no legal rules while showing
no evidence whatsoever of any abuse of the law.
Coda
The Commission has proven Harry Frankfurt right: ‘One of the most salient features
of our culture is that there is so much bullshit’. It has taken us for a bullshit ride,
19th century style, telling 20 Member States that they most likely do it wrong,
while enjoying no competence to regulate the field and demonstrating rather poor
command of the matter in question. Many will no doubt be offended by it, while Blood
and Soil communitarians of all sorts will cheer. Beyond the haphazard argumentation
and willful misinformation concerning citizenship in general and EU citizenship law
in particular, the Report sends a very clear message: the Commission wants to
regulate citizenship, telling France who is a Frenchmen and Estonians who has
‘genuine links’ to Estonia; the Commission – and this is scary, not merely offensive
– could believe in ‘genuine links’, ready to sacrifice core principles the EU is based
on; and, lastly, the consensus on whether citizenship and residence by investment
is actually a problem is entirely missing – otherwise we would have a chance to
comment on a serious analysis. Ideology and incompetence have won for now. 
The author chairs the Investment Migration Council in Geneva and is the author of
‘Citizenship’ forthcoming with MIT Press this year. Every year the author updates
“Henley and Partners — Kochenov Quality of Nationality Index” measuring the
quality of all the nationalities around the world.
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